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International Relations Theory in Flux  
in View of China's 'Peaceful Rise'
GORDON C. K. CHEUNG
Abstract
This paper attempts to examine the fact that the conventional theoretical ap-
proaches used to understand international relations, especially hegemonic 
stability theory, have been witnessing consistent problems arising both from the 
experiences of the current hegemon, the US, and the challenge posed by the rise 
of China, a power which is increasingly willing and able to project and promote 
its historical and cultural position in the East Asian region through community 
building and soft power development. By analyzing both the theoretical discus-
sion on hegemonic stability and constructivism, as well as criticism of the cultural 
dimensions of Chinese soft power, it concludes that China's cultural factors have 
become more useful and increasingly will be perpetuated more extensively as 
long as they ﬁt into the political dynamics and economic changes in East Asia. 
Key words: China, hegemonic stability, Confucianism, soft power, constructivism
Introduction
This paper attempts to examine the fact that the conventional theoretical 
approaches used to understand international relations, especially hege-
monic stability theory, have been witnessing consistent problems arising 
both from the experiences of the current hegemon -the US- and the chal-
lenge posed by the rise of China, a power which is increasingly willing 
and able to project and promote its historical and cultural position in 
the East Asian region through community building and soft power or 
simply 'peaceful rise (heping jueqi)' (Zheng 2005). Hu Jintao ﬁrst used 
the term 'peaceful rise' in autumn 2003. Yet, the theoretical foundation 
was built by Zheng Bijian, Vice-president of the Central Committee's 
Central Party School.  The notion of peaceful rise, according to Zheng, 
rests on three principles: perpetuating economic and political reform 
through the promotion of a socialist market economy, seeking cultural 
support for China's peaceful rise and balancing the interests from dif-
ferent sectors internally and externally to support its rise. (Glaser and 
Medeiros 2007: 294-295) The term 'peaceful rise' is either considered a 
reﬂection of China recognizing 'America is even stronger' or projecting 
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China as 'a hidden threat.' (The Economist, 24 June 2004) The peaceful rise 
is manifested via business and trade deals, Confucianism, soft power 
and East Asian education cooperation rather than more traditional 
mechanisms of war and military alliances.
China has been trying to solidify its regional hegemony and historical 
relations in East Asia with a view to project its position as the establish-
ment status quo power by redeeming her East Asian historical/cultural 
relations, so as to confront the current system (from economic to politi-
cal) of East Asian international relations established by the US.  Some 
new Chinese textbooks also outline the grand strategy of China in 
Asia. For instance, Pang Zhongying has been trying to 'normalize' the 
East Asia region through Chinese effort. (2004: 189-190) Ikenberry and 
Mastanduno argued that 'Despite the robustness of American power, 
the ability of the United States to extend the frontier of its liberal he-
gemonic order further into Asia is problematic.' (2003: 8) Jia Qingguo, 
a professor from Beijing University, also emphasized the notion that 
external construction plays a crucial role in the formation and projection 
of Chinese nationalism:
[E]xternal factors are at least as important as historical, psychological and 
political factors in shaping the development of contemporary Chinese 
nationalism. If one accepts constructivism's argument in international relations, 
i.e. that a state's behavior is in part a product of the interaction between nation-
states, current Chinese nationalism is also in part a product of the interactions 
between China and the outside world. (2005: 17-18)
This paper will ﬁrst critically assess the notion of hegemonic stability 
through examination of Joseph Nye's depiction of the paradox between 
the power construction of the US and the exercise of soft power. The 
second section of the paper will examine the social construction of the 
concept of Chinese soft power through the inﬂuence of the economic 
values of Confucianism across East Asia, and the historical and cultural 
inﬂuences of text books, media (allowing international media to cover 
the earthquake in Sichuan in May 2008, for instance) and academic dis-
semination to enhance its power construction process. The ﬁnal section 
will be a critical assessment of these measures in relation to the percep-
tion of China's peaceful rise.  
Contested US Power Relations
The United States has long been regarded as the hegemonic successor to 
Great Britain after Second World War. However, Joseph Nye disagreed 
with this assertion. He argued that 'The United States never enjoyed a 
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general hegemony after the war, so hegemony can be neither lost nor 
regained in the future.' (2002: 108) Charles Kindleberger's book (1973) 
ﬁrst used the concept of hegemonic stability to assess US procrastination 
in exercising its ﬁnancial leadership after the Great Depression in 1929. 
However, it was Robert Gilpin who systematically theorized the ups 
and downs of hegemonic succession through marginal cost analysis. He 
states that 'These successive dominant states have changed the system, 
expanding until an equilibrium is reached between the costs and beneﬁts 
of further change and expansion.' (1981: 156) The hegemon will either 
cease to exist in that position, or being heavily criticized by the other 
states, shift from the role of being a balancer to that of a beneﬁciary, if 
not predator, of the system.
The opening up of the US market for goods from Hong Kong in the 
1960s was said to be beneﬁcial to Hong Kong in the face of the large 
number of immigrants from Communist China. (US Senate 1962). In 
order to tackle the immediate problems of a large inﬂux of refugees, 
the US opened its market to Hong Kong's exports. It was both a care-
ful calculation of the containment strategy as well as a way in which 
economic hegemonic function was maintained. However, the inability 
of maintaining the Bretton Woods System in the early 1970s (US dol-
lars pegged with gold) foretold the weakening of the US as a monetary 
hegemon. (Komiya, Okuno and Suzumura 1988: 318) The trade disputes 
between the US and Japan over the semi-conductor industry in the 
1980s revealed that national interests prevailed and the marginal cost 
of being a hegemon was too large in relation to the economic beneﬁt. 
(Prestowitz 1988: 121) The current demand by many in the international 
community on the Chinese government to allow the Chinese currency 
(yuan or renminbi) to appreciate, was a result of the persistent trade 
deﬁcit experienced with China. The US has experienced a growing 
trade deﬁcit with China, increasing from about US$83 billion in 2000 to 
US$237 billion in 2007.1 The US's role as a facilitator in maintaining its 
monetary hegemony was further discredited during the Asian ﬁnancial 
crisis. Joseph Stiglitz, Nobel Prize winner 2001, asserted that pushing 
Korea to liberalize its immature ﬁnancial market before 1997 was ben-
eﬁcial to the US, and especially US ﬁrms. (2003: 221-222) By pursuing 
an economic policy of 'ﬁshing in the troubled waters', however, the US 
displayed behaviour seen by those in the region as below the standard 
expected of a hegemon.
Nye later modiﬁed his idea on the development of hegemony in The 
Paradox of American Power (2002). The so-called American hegemonic 
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leadership should be analyzed through further examination of glo-
balization and transnational relations. It can be graphically depicted 
as follows:
FIGURE 1: Three Levels of Power Structure: A Critique of Hegemonic Stability
Power of What? Power Structure Dominated Actors
Military Unipolar U.S.
Economic Multipolar
U.S., Europe, Japan and 
China 
Transnational Relations
Outside government's 
control
Non-state actors: 
bankers, electronic 
herds
Source: Compiled from Nye (2002: 39).
As can be seen from ﬁgure 1, the current hegemonic leadership of 
the US is predominantly exercised through preponderance of military 
power. In terms of economic power and transnational relations, the US 
has to share power with regional entities as well as non-state actors. 
Among different economic issues, the US has to work with some inter-
national organizations, such as World Trade Organization (WTO) and 
World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) to facilitate policy 
co-ordination. Following this line of argument, John Odell developed 
the idea that states needed to negotiate within the framework of an 
international economic chessboard of transnational relations (2002). 
Increasingly, the US has been excluded from some very important 
regional decision making processes in East Asia. (For example, the As-
sociation of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) + 3 (China, Japan and 
Korea) and East Asian Summit (EAS) did not even include the US as 
member (Dent 2008: 18)). On issues related to high politics or military 
confrontation, such as the Six-Party Talks in 2003 and 2004 over the 
North Korean nuclear crisis, the US had to work collectively with Rus-
sia, China, Japan, South Korea and North Korea in order to develop a 
kind of institutionalized political framework for regional security issue. 
(Choo 2005: 39-58). In terms of transnational actors and relations, the 
US, rather than being a hegemon, has become the target for criticism in 
areas such as environmental policy (refusal to sign the Kyoto Protocol), 
transnational migration and drug trafﬁcking.
After many years serving in the Pentagon as Assistant Secretary of 
Defence during Clinton's administration in the 1990s, Nye eventually 
grew disillusioned with the narrow focus of the military strategies used 
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in the formation of US foreign policy. More alarmingly, he suspected 
that the US might lose its friends and inﬂuence because power was de-
ﬁned too narrowly among the decision-makers. Later, he bowed out and 
returned to the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University 
to devote himself to the study of 'soft power' which, according to him, 
can rescue the US from isolation. Long before the materialization of the 
concept of soft power, Keohane and Nye were working on the ideas of 
power and interdependence during the height of the Cold War in the 
1970s to search for ways of international cooperation under which they 
calculated that interdependence could be maintained through multiple 
channels in dealing with international affairs, non hierarchical world 
relations and non-military means were a priority (1989: 24-25).
The term soft power was ﬁrst coined by Joseph Nye to suggest the 
importance of the US maintaining soft power in the age of globalization 
because 'the presence of multiple cultures creates avenues of connec-
tion with other countries and helps create a necessary broadening of 
American attitudes in an era of globalization' (2002: 119). The concept 
of soft power was the culmination of various ideas and themes Nye had 
expressed in the past. In short, soft power refers to 'attractive power' 
instead of coercive power (Nye 2004: 5-6). Nye worried that 'The United 
States' most striking failure is the low priority and paucity of resources 
it has devoted to producing soft power' (Nye 2004: 19).  Nye hinted 
at the importance of the US in maintaining soft power in the age of 
globalization when he stated, 'the presence of multiple cultures creates 
avenues of connection with other countries and helps create a neces-
sary broadening of American attitudes in an era of globalization'(2002: 
119). In this sense, China has seized the opportunity (if not hijacking 
the concept) to facilitate soft power capital in the implementation of its 
proclaimed peaceful rise, thereby creating the graduate deterioration 
of US inﬂuence in East Asia.
The Social Construction of Chinese Soft Power
Social constructivism was heavily drawn from the sociologist's under-
standing of social interaction between individuals and societies. Peter 
Berger and Thomas Luckmann (1967) ﬁrst pointed out the importance 
of individual behaviours in relation to social changes and development. 
Individual is not a priori derived, which means one's behaviours can 
actually be modiﬁed through social changes. Along some similar lines, 
George Herbert Mead once stated that 'What we have here is a situa-
tion in which there can be different selves, and it is dependent upon the 
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set of social reactions that is involved as to which self we are going to 
be' (1934: 143). Nicholas Onuf ﬁrst applied social constructivism to the 
understanding of global relations with a view to examining social in-
teractions and non-material based elements and ingredients rather than 
hard power context and military struggle. In the World of Our Making, he 
contended that 'It does not draw a sharp distinction between material 
and social realities – the material and the social contaminate each other, 
but variably – and it does not grant sovereignty to either the material or 
the social by deﬁning the other out of existence' (1989: 40).
The climax of social constructivism came with Alexander Wendt's 
heavy scale attack on the realist school, focused on two issues: identities 
and interests (1992 and 1999). He clearly stated 'My objective … is to 
build a bridge between these two traditions (and by extension, between 
the realist-liberal and rationalist-reﬂectivist debates) by developing a 
constructivist argument, drawn from structurationist and symbolic 
interactionist sociology, on behalf of the liberal claim that international 
institutions can transform state identities and interests.' (Wendt 1999: 
391) His ideas on the challenges posed by the materially based arguments 
of the realist school became clear in Social Theory of International Politics, 
which juxtaposes the argument of social construction of IR in a larger 
context, concerning culturally based elements (Wendt 1999). As Wendt 
continued, one very important function of culture is to create collective 
memories: '[O]nce collective memories have been created it may be hard 
to shake their long-term effects, even if a majority of individuals have 
''forgotten'' them at any given moment.' (Wendt 1999: 163). In this sense, 
Wendt augmented the notion of international relations theory, forcing 
it to take into consideration the importance of interaction, learning and 
epistemology seriously as core arguments underpinning international 
studies (Wendt 1992: 399 and 416). In a later critique on Mearsheimer's 
article, Wendt elaborated further, '[C]onstructivists argue that material 
resources only acquire meaning for human action through the structure 
of shared knowledge in which they are embedded.' (Wendt 1995: 73; 
Mearsheimer 1995). 
In East Asia, social constructivism has been modiﬁed to extend the 
argument beyond the identity building among Southeast Asians, given 
their truncated colonial history and cultural diversity. As Benedict An-
derson wrote in his seminal work Imagined Communities: Reﬂections on 
the Origin and Spread of Nationalism 'Nations, however, have no clearly 
identiﬁable births, and their deaths, if they ever happen, are never 
natural. Because there is no originator, the nation's biography cannot 
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be written evangelically, ''down time,'' through a long procreative chain 
of begettings.' (1991: 205). If the imprints of history can facilitate social 
changes, other nations with a much stronger cultural heritage can be 
most effective in such cultural embedding, for example between China 
and East Asian countries. 
The missing gaps between ideas and culture between China and East 
Asia were ﬁrst bridged by David Kang. His controversial article 'Getting 
Asia Wrong' strongly suggested that China's historical weakness was 
the result of the chaos and disturbance in East Asia in its contemporary 
history, not the other way round. According to Kang, 'Historically, it has 
been Chinese weakness that has led to chaos in Asia. When China has 
been strong and stable, order has been preserved' (2003: 59). Obviously, 
he did not subscribe entirely the notion of constructivism being eclec-
tic. Nor did he want to make 'a plea for research that includes a touch 
of realism, a dash of constructivism, and a pinch of liberalism.' (Kang 
2003: 66) By bringing history and culture, Peter Hays Gries depicted a 
path through language as a means for the re-construction of Chinese 
identity. He contended 'Culture does matter: cultural differences clearly 
played a major role in the Sino-American apology diplomacy of April 
2001 (2005: 109). More importantly, historical identities are being used 
and constructed as ways to rescue the Communist Party from losing 
'hegemony over Chinese nationalist discourse.' (135) As David Campbell 
successfully indicates, US Cold War security can be re-written through 
the 'reconceptualization of identity and the state' (1992: 8). China ap-
parently has been facilitating its historical legacy (in terms of historical, 
culture, social capital and ideational advantages) to further enhance and 
create a soft power base to motivate neighbouring East Asian countries 
to develop more cordial relations with China.
Confucianism
The economic values of Confucianism have been discussed widely by 
those who examine the economic activities of the Chinese overseas in 
Southeast Asia. Gordon Redding contended that 'directly Confucian 
ideals, and especially familism as a central tenet, are still well enough 
embedded in the minds of most Overseas Chinese to make Confucian-
ism the most apposite single-word label for the values which govern 
most of their social behaviours' (1993: 2). This common cultural trait 
integrates economic and social relations among the overseas Chinese to 
form the foundation of working habits and the craftsmanship of busi-
ness activities (Cheung 2004).
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The extent of Confucianism, according to Peter Berger and Michael 
Hsiao, may help trace the ideas in which cultural consensus can be ar-
ticulated through the 'Odyssey' of cultural history among some Asian 
states. Their personal encounters and interviews conducted in various 
Asian countries such as South Korea, Taiwan, Japan, Singapore and 
Hong Kong  have allowed  them to derive an 'East Asian development 
Model' (Berger and Hsiao 1988: 4). The assumption or the major ingre-
dient of the Asian model maintained that 'both Japan and the newly 
industrialized countries of East Asia belong to the broad area of inﬂu-
ence of Sinitic civilization, and there can be no doubt that Confucianism 
has been a very powerful force in all of them' (Berger and Hsiao 1988: 
7). The powerful force underneath Confucianism is interpreted further 
by Hsiao as the 'Confucianist moral deﬁnition of the state' (1988: 18). 
The Confucian tradition of Asian countries, therefore, enables the state 
to mobilize human resources more freely, as well as the use of bureau-
cratic authority.
Furthermore, the Confucian ideal of strong family tradition is used 
extensively by Siu-lun Wong (1989) as a model to analyse the moderni-
zation of Hong Kong's economy. Admitting the tradition of family ties 
and subordination of paternalism, Wong suggests that so called 'pater-
nalistic management' (Wong 1989: 174) is the core successful mode of 
Hong Kong's economy. In particular, the emphasis on entrepreneurial-
ism among Hong Kong people also gives rise to a vibrant and vigorous 
economic and industrial structure for the growth of Hong Kong. The 
above mentioned factors are some representative opinions of scholars 
who use Confucianism as a way of understanding Asian economic 
growth. Many of them extensively use such doctrines as family relations, 
respect, hierarchical structure of kinship, management of society, etc. 
as a foundation for their argument. 
Soft Power of China
In China, the use of soft power to facilitate the peaceful rise of China has 
gained momentum. Ding and Saunders' studies force us to think about 
the obsolescence of using traditional balances of power or force to deter 
China from rising. On the contrary, the Chinese language, along with 
globally established Confucian values are gradually being accepted as 
symbols of Chinese soft power (2006: 3-33). Huang and Ding further 
explained that global perceptions  of China's cultural importance and 
the contest of soft power are actually quite positive (2006: 22-44). 'Chi-
na's patience, conﬁdence, and rising economic power translate into a 
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growing pool of ''soft'' power', according to Jean Garrison, 'giving China 
increasing inﬂuence in East Asia and the global economic system' (2005: 
25). In Charm Offensive: How China's Soft Power in Transforming the World, 
Joshua Kurlantzick argued: 'China's soft power indeed has proven suc-
cessful in many cities [in East Asia] like Mandalay, allowing China in 
some cases to supplant the United States as the major external cultural 
and economic inﬂuence' (2007: 107). Li Ying-chun (2006) echoed Zheng's 
aforementioned notion of peaceful rise. By strengthening China's soft 
power capabilities over historical culture, Li argues, involving it in 
global affairs with a view to accommodate Chinese interests,  develop-
ing a communication industry, and promoting a 'Beijing Consensus' or 
'Chinese model' to challenge the Washington Consensus (Ramo 2004). 
Another way to facilitate Chinese soft power is to substantiate 'Public 
Diplomacy,' including media diplomacy, educational exchange, organ-
izing international events, etc, in order to create a responsible image 
(Huang 2005). 
In contrast to the double-act between the US and IMF measures toward 
East Asian countries before and after the Asian ﬁnancial crisis, China did 
something less expected by the West, which proved to be another strong 
case for the maneuverability of  soft power. After the Asian ﬁnancial 
crisis in 1997, China did not capitalize immediately from the dilapidated 
ﬁnancial chaos across the East Asian region by devaluating its currency, 
the Renminbi. Senior leaders such as Zhu Rongji, Dai Xianglong and Li 
Lanqing made explicit and coherent statements on their refusal to devalue 
the Renminbi. These statements were made in many international forums 
and on important occasions after the crisis, such as the Insurance and 
Securities System Conference on 14 January 1998, the Press release of 
National Affairs Department on 23 January 1998 and the Annual Meet-
ing of World Economy Forum on 1 February 1998.2
Another way in which China could conjure up a collective historical 
memory across East Asia, is to re-interpret East Asian history in a way 
which reinforce a cultural and regional consensus for the education 
of the next generation. This process of socialization, according to G. 
John Ikenberry and Charles A. Kupchan, is crucial because 'At the in-
ternational level, the emerging hegemon articulates a set of normative 
principles in order to facilitate the construction of an order conducive 
to its interest' (1990: 284). A team of academics from China, Japan and 
Korea, for instance, have been working on a collaborative project to 
create a textbook on the history of East Asia Dongya sanguo di jinxiandai 
shi [The Contemporary and Modern History of Three East Asian Coun-
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tries] (Dongya sanguo … 2005). The reason for such collaborative effort, 
according to their main argument, was to reconcile their historical disa-
greements on the contemporary history of East Asia. These differences 
were due to differing view points, national interests and interpretations. 
Through historical documentation, they were trying to focus on several 
historical pieces such as the Japanese aggression and the demonstration 
of the importance of the Confucian inﬂuence across this region. (Dongya 
sanguo... 53) However, as I argued previously (Cheung 2008: 197):
Apart from providing the basic cultural and historical development of these 
three countries, the narrative of their  contemporary history was almost stopped 
around the time of World War II (with only a ﬂimsy ﬁnal chapter about the 
future East Asian trajectory), leaving the history of the Cold War un-touched. If 
the history of the Cold War was basically constructed by the US, the omission 
of this big chunk of history is trying to erase the presence of the US in East Asia 
via soft educational power. 
In addition to scientiﬁc contributions, Chinese social sciences have 
also witnessed an integration with the main stream academic channels 
through the publication of various academic journals, which effectively 
opened up a window of opportunity for China to penetrate into the 
international academic discourse, a ﬁeld which has always been pre-
occupied by US ideas (Hix 2004: 298; O'Leary 2005: 3).3 For instance, 
China & World Economy, the ofﬁcial journal of The Institute of World 
Economics and Politics, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences (CASS) 
has been successfully linked up with the main stream English publish-
ers.4 In Hong Kong International Airport, you can ﬁnd China & World 
Economy displayed side-by-side with other media books, business books 
or general magazines in the book stores. Placing an academic journal 
such as China & World Economy in an international airport inevitably 
brings some pro-China ideas (economic and political) to the attention 
of global travellers, business people, academic workers, etc. Secondly, a 
group of scholars from Tsinghua University established a journal entitled 
The Chinese Journal of International Politics which was aimed at 'provid-
ing a forum for academic papers and articles on problematic issues. 
Most of its articles are either related to China or have implications for 
Chinese foreign policy.'5 Obviously, such development will not replace 
the dominance of the US in the academic discourse. Nevertheless, the 
intention is to disseminate Chinese academic (both CASS and Tsing-
hua are relatively more pro-government) viewpoints through English 
language media, a powerful soft power element that can gradually 
inﬂuence people's thinking.
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A recent example of the so-called peaceful rise of China was when China 
Central Television (CCTV) (the mouthpiece TV channel)'s TV series Daguo 
Jueqi [The Rise of Great Powers] - a 12-part TV series on the study of the 
rise and fall of nine historical great powers - was aired on TV from 13 to 
24 November  2006. The countries proﬁled in the  series-Portugal, Spain, 
Holland, Great Britain, France, Germany, Japan, former Soviet Union and 
the United States of America-were selected and heavily documented to 
pave the way for the call of the rise of China in the future. According to 
Yazhou Zhoukan's analysis (a Hong Kong-based Chinese magazine), this 
TV series looked at the rise of great powers from a positive angle, not 
necessarily from the conventional notion of victim/victor, or Marxist 
view of exploitation. To put it simply, this so-called 'general education' 
TV show gave the impression that China will naturally take its place as 
one of the world's great powers in time (10 December 2006, 68-75). By the 
same token, the relaxation of the media coverage (local and overseas) of 
the earthquake in Sichuan province in May 2008 further perpetuated the 
established notion of Chinese soft power (Yazhou Zhoukan, 1 June 2008 , 
24-31). Such gestures help reinforce the openness of Chinese politics, al-
lowing international society to assess through global medias.
Cultural Assessment and the Peaceful Rise of China
The post-Cold War world economy has witnessed a more pluralistic 
distribution of power among different nations of various sizes and 
capability. If a nation tries not to be drawn into the swamp of the con-
temporary world politics, or even attempts to be included in the exist-
ing situation, it has 'to obtain a broad measure of consent on general 
principles - principles that ensure the supremacy of the leading state 
and dominant social class - and at the same time to offer some prospect 
of satisfaction to the less powerful' (Nye 1991: 32). If power is deﬁned 
as an act of inﬂuence, the instrument should not be seen as too coercive, 
or as having the result of jeopardizing too much the position of less 
powerful states. 
The notion of a Chinese peaceful rise, does not mean that China is 
moving towards a frontal assault with the US through direct competi-
tion in a zero sum manner, which, according to, Thomas Christensen, 
would imply that 'China's deepening economic and diplomatic ties to 
the region have come at a high price for the United States because, by 
necessity, those newly developed ties increase China's power in the 
region' (2006: 82). In fact, China openly refused to be the hegemonic 
successor, contradictory to many realists who assumed that should be a 
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logical outcome of Sino-American relations. Neither did China want to 
sacriﬁce three decades of economic development after 1978, which has 
now become almost the only reserve of legitimacy left to rationalize the 
continued monopoly of power of the Chinese Communist Party (Rossi 
2005, Pei 2006 and Cheung 2006). Although Hu Jintao has pointed out 
the importance of 'scientiﬁc development' and 'harmonious society' in his 
17th Party Congress report in October 2007, the focus of the report was 
intended to convey a continuation of Deng Xiaoping's idea on economic 
development.6 Nor does it make any difference if the rise of China has 
turned into an economic force that has challenged American economic 
hegemony, providing competition to US economic interests regarding 
acquisitions, and more generally competing with economic sectors that 
are considered to be very critical and sensitive in maintaining US power 
and prosperity (Marchick 2006).
In addition, the extent of the use of Confucianism is not without limi-
tation. Its concept goes beyond the two founding fathers' (Confucius 
and Mencius) ideas. As a concept, Confucianism has a well-established 
meaning. The Analects of Confucius (1992) contains the dialogues be-
tween Confucius and his students, aiming at fostering the proper way 
of governance and the crux of human relations.7 For instance, in Book 
16, Ji Shi, Confucius has substantiated his idea of equality by saying 
that 'For when wealth is equally distributed, there will be no poverty; 
when the people are united, a small population will not matter much; 
and when there is stability throughout the land, there will be no such 
things as peril and subversion' (The Analects of Confucius 1992: 281). It 
is clear that his idea of government concerns the fairness of society. 
The connotation is much closer to socialism than capitalism. Again, the 
sense of growth and economic development is less transcendent in the 
original spirit of Confucius. 
Furthermore, in practice, if Confucianism has such a profound 
effect on economic development, how come North Korea, Thailand 
and Burma were suffered from poverty before World War II, given 
that Korea subscribed to Confucianism and Thailand and Burma had 
substantial Chinese populations? Finally, to put it more bluntly, Ezra 
F. Vogel argued that 'If Confucianism alone explains why countries 
modernize, why should the Confucian motherland lag behind? It is 
true that after 1949, failure can be attributed to socialist planning, but 
China had not achieved widespread industrialization before 1949, 
either' (1991: 84). Finally, Confucianism entails other dimensions of 
social and economic interactions, which perhaps should also be taken 
_________________________________________________________________________17
___________ International Relations Theory in Flux in View of China's 'Peaceful Rise'
into consideration in a comprehensive assessment on the cultural ex-
planation of political economy. By ignoring 'the historical processes 
and speciﬁc relations of political power,' according to Lisa Wedeen, 
'the treatment of culture in political science has downplayed the het-
erogeneous ways in which people experience the social order within 
and among groups…' (2002: 715).
China's soft power relations are inevitably useful in the current debate 
on the discussion of US power relations and the rise of China's economic 
and political proﬁle. As William Callahan argues 'China is not merely 
trying to use its new economic power to transform its political status 
from that of a third world country to that of a Great Power. In addition 
to catching up to the West economically, China now aims to narrow 
the ''normative gap'' in international relations theory' (Callahan 2004: 
570). From in-depth interviews and analysis on Chinese nationalism, 
Peter Hays Gries concluded that there is a general feeling in China that 
'China's sun will rise as America's sets' (2005a: 406). Using culture and 
civilization within the soft power approach, is one way to view Chinese 
culture as the historical lynchpin. The key question is not its usefulness, 
but a matter of acceptance, especially from the points of view of the exist-
ing hegemony. In the keynote address delivered in the National Bureau 
on Asian Research in November 2006, Kenneth Pyle, Henry M. Jackson 
Professor of History and Asian Studies at the University of Washington, 
rightly pointed out the importance of the use of history and culture in 
the making of US foreign policy. He reminded us that 'The ability of the 
United States to pursue its traditional goals of maintaining a balance of 
power, keeping the region open to trade and investment, and pressing 
for the expansion of democracy is more constrained because this is now a 
region in some ways much more pro-active and resistant to US inﬂuence' 
(Pyle 2006: 11). The regional and global institutions that the US helped 
create, however, remained intact and will be sustainable even when the 
US hegemonic power has eclipsed. Similar arguments came along in the 
same vein by Chinese watcher in the US. Susan Shirk in China: Fragile 
Superpower, clearly stated that 'The best way for China to rise peacefully 
is to behave like a responsible power and accommodate to the current 
superpower, the United States' (2007: 219). On another occasion, John 
Ikenberry echoed the point 'it may be possible for China to overtake the 
United States alone, but it is much less likely that China will ever manage 
to overtake the Western order' (2008: 37). He concluded that the US may 
be weakened, but China has to comply with the established world order 
created by the US and its partners. China is a follower after all. 
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Conclusion  
In conclusion, this paper demonstrates that the theoretical notion of 
hegemonic stability needs substantial improvement through which 
the current hegemon—the US—is increasingly less able to facilitate 
most of the functions which were taken for granted for decades. With 
the approach of a more interdependent and diversiﬁed global environ-
ment, international affairs are perhaps less suitable to be carried out by 
a single dominant power. Many agendas and issues are transnational 
in nature, with more countries sharing different parts of it. The peace-
ful rise of China within the arena of foreign policy cumulates with the 
unique nature of Chinese economic and social changes. However, these 
factors do not necessarily coincide with the established power relations 
in the East Asian region. Yet, East Asian economic development and 
the regionalization of many economic, political and international rela-
tions allow countries in this region to augment its sphere of inﬂuence 
which, nevertheless, enables some historical and cultural discourse to 
penetrate into the consensus building process. China's cultural past, 
therefore, has become more useful and, increasingly, will be exploited 
more extensively, as long as it ﬁts  the political dynamics and economic 
changes in East Asia.
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NOTES
1  U. S. Census Bureau 2000-2007 [http://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/balance/
c5700.html] (accessed January 26, 2007)
2  People's Daily, January 15, 1998: 1; People's Daily, January 24, 1998: 1 and People's 
Daily, February 2, 1998: 1.
3  For instance, nine of the top ten (measured by impact score) Political Science journals 
are American journals.
4  http://www.blackwell-synergy.com/loi/cwe (accessed May 3, 2007)
5  http://cjip.oxfordjournals.org/ (accessed February 23, 2008)
6  Report of the 17th NPC [http://cpc.people.com.cn/GB/104019/104099/6429414.
html] (accessed on October 15, 2007).
7  All together, there are twenty books in The Analects of Confucius. They are all dia-
logues. Those dialogues distill many abstract ideas of governance into workable 
disciplines of day-to-day practical norms. See (Analects of Confucius 1992).
